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I. INTRODUCTION
At first glance, one may wonder how being subjected to punish-
ment could ever be viewed as a "right" rather than an onus of the
severest sort. If "rights" are claims that must be honored upon asser-
tion, why would anyone in possession of his or her senses, even a
* Steinhart Foundation Professor of Law, University of Nebraska-Lincoln. B.S.,
J.D., University of Utah.
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youngster whose "senses" may be incompletely developed to begin
with, ever demand to be punished? In this Article, I hope to answer
such questions and demonstrate why recognition of the right to be
punished might significantly advance the interests of certain juvenile
offenders.
This Article begins by sketching a theory of personhood and argu-
ing that persons possess the right to be punished. Next, in contrast to
traditional protectionist rights theory, the Article presents the claim
that competent adolescents are autonomous "persons" who therefore
possess the right to be punished. Finally, after presenting a theory for
a constitutional right to be punished, the Article will examine some
implications of such a right as it relates to the traditional juvenile jus-
tice system.
II. PERSONS AND PUNISHMENT
In his highly influential paper, Persons and Punishment, Professor
Herbert Morris argued that guilty persons have a moral right to be
punished for their criminal offenses.' Under Morris's theory, the
right to be punished derives from a more fundamental natural right,
inalienable and absolute, to be treated as a person.2 "Persons" are
those individuals possessed of the capacity for rational choice.3 Per-
sons are entitled to have their choices respected.4 Therefore, when
one chooses responsibly to engage in morally reprehensible conduct
prohibited by a just system of criminal law,5 one also chooses the con-
1. Morris, Persons and Punishment, in PUNISHMENT 74 (J. Feinberg & H. Gross eds.
1975). For an example of the influence of Professor Morris's work, see A. VON
HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 48 (1976). Professor Mor-
ris's paper is reprinted in numerous collections of essays on punishment. See, e.g.,
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 116 (G. Ezorsky ed. 1972) [herein-
after PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES]; SENTENCING 93 (H. Gross & A. von Hirsch
eds. 1981). Much of the ensuing discussion of Morris's theory is derived from the
author's earlier work, Gardner, The Right to be Punished-A Suggested Constitu-
tional Theory, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 838, 839-46 (1981).
2. Morris, supra note 1, at 84-86. The right to be treated as a person is "inalienable"
in the sense that the right cannot be waived or transferred to another, and "abso-
lute" in the sense that it always exists, even if occasions arise morally requiring
that a person be denied this right.
3. Id. at 82-86.
4. Id. at 79.
5. Professor Morris's right to be punished is applicable only within a legal system
which conditions punishment on a careful finding that a person is guilty of violat-
ing a "primary rule" which is similar to a core rule of our criminal law. To avoid
unjust applications of punishment, accused offenders must be afforded a variety
of substantive defenses permitting them to show that their offenses were invol-
untary or otherwise excusable or justifiable. Moreover, the system must provide
safeguards against double jeopardy and self-incrimination, rights to trial by jury,
requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a prerequisite to conviction,
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sequences of his offense: punishment.6
Nonpunitive responses to deviant conduct, most notably sanctions
imposing compulsory therapy or rehabilitation,7 regard the deviant be-
havior as merely symptomatic of pathological conditions or emotional
immaturity rather than as the actions of responsible human agents.8
Coerced therapeutic responses fail to respect the rational choices, and
thus the personhood, of the offender.9 Whereas therapy and rehabili-
tation are directed toward altering undesirable status conditions pres-
ently possessed by the offender, with no necessary interest in
proportioning the degree or kind of treatment to past undesirable con-
duct, punishment necessarily limits the amount of suffering the of-
fender must endure to that deemed proper to pay the "debt" owed
society through commission of the offense.10 Moreover, therapy tends
toward paternalism and coercion insofar as the therapist is assumed to
know, and thus often permitted to use, those treatments that will be
beneficial, no matter how objectionable the "patient" may find them.11
On the other hand, the primary thrust of punishment, rather than
seeking to benefit the offender, is to exact from the recipient his debt
and protections against punishment that is disproportionate to the seriousness of
the offense or the culpability of the offender. Id. at 75-78.
6. Professor Morris justifies the institution of punishment both as a necessary
moans of promoting compliance with the law and as a requirement of justice. Id.
at 75-80. Justice demands that an offender be punished in order to restore the
equilibrium lost through the offender's renunciation of the burdens of law-abid-
ing conduct. Without punishment, the offender would gain an unfair advantage
over law-abiding citizens because he would receive the benefits of life within the
legal order without assuming the burdens of restraining his conduct in accord-
ance with the rules of the legal system. Id.
7. For purposes of this Article, the author draws no distinction between the con-
cepts of "therapy" and "rehabilitation." "Therapy" may be defined as the "alter-
ing of a person's undesirable physical or mental condition in the manner most
beneficial to the person." Gardner, supra note 1, at 846. See also Gardner, Pun-
ishment and Juvenile Justice: A Conceptual Framework for Assessing Constitu-
tional Rights of Youthful Offenders, 35 VAND. L. REv. 791, 815-16
(1982)[hereinafter Punishment and Juvenile Justice].
8. Morris, supra note 1, at 76-80.
9. Id.
10. Id. The author has defined "punishment":
(1) Punishment is the purposeful imposition of unpleasant restraints
by one person or authority upon another person.
(2) Punishment is a sanction imposed upon a person for his offense or
alleged offense against social or moral norms of conduct that also are
usually, but not always, the subject of a preexisting legal rule that de-
fines the offense and sets the amount of penalty for its commission.
(3) Punishment is imposed to exact retribution and may also operate to
deter undesirable conduct.
(4) Punishment is often imposed upon offenders who, in addition to vi-
olating legal rules, are (or are believed to be) morally culpable.
Punishment and Juvenile Justice, supra note 7, at 817 (footnotes omitted).
11. Morris, supra note 1, at 79-80.
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to society, payment of which nullifies his guilt.' 2
As a theory of justice, the right to be punished embraces the tradi-
tional retributive requirements that the form and degree of punish-
ment be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense as determined
by the characteristic harmfulness of the conduct and the individual
culpability of the offender.13 Moreover, forms of punishment that fail
to respect the dignity of the person are, of course, impermissible.14
Persons are subject only to just and humane punishment. Persons
have rights to be free from unjust, cruel, or inhumane punishments.' 5
While punishment entails the purposeful infliction of suffering
upon an offender for his offense, no special form of punishment is re-
quired under the right to be punished.16 Some forms of punishment,
such as imprisonment or death, connote social disapprobation,17 while
others, such as fines or periods of probation,'S do not.' 9 Under Mor-
ris's theory, the offender has a right to whatever disposition suffi-
ciently addresses his guilt. He has no right to dispositions reflecting
his shame. So long as the offender is made to suffer in proportion to
the seriousness of his offense, the form of the suffering is irrelevant.20
Under Morris's theory, the right to be treated as a person, and its
derivative right to be punished, do not require abandoning all thera-
peutic responses to criminal offenders. Young children and certain
mentally ill individuals lack the capacity for rational choice and thus
are unable to function as persons.21 Although such individuals possess
the right to be treated as persons, complete exercise of the right is
postponed until such time as they acquire the capacity for rational
choice.22 When such individuals violate the law, it cannot plausibly be
maintained that they have "chosen" to be punished; they therefore
12. Id. at 77-78.
13. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 66, 79-80.
14. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 863.
15. For a discussion on the eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and unu-
sual punishment, see infra notes 83-111 and accompanying text.
16. Gardner, supra note 1, at 862; Morris, supra note 1, at 80.
17. See generally J. FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING
AND DESERVING 95 (1970).
18. "Probation" is often defined as a manifestation of the rehabilitative ideal which
allows the imposition of "conditions" geared to the "needs" of individual offend-
ers as an alternative to imprisonment. Probation is thus often considered to be a
nonpunitive sanction.
However, probation may constitute a form of "punishment" if its conditions
reflect the "purposeful imposition of unpleasant restraints" imposed upon "an
offender for his offense." See Punishment and Juvenile Justice, supra note 7, at
817.
19. See J. FEINBERG, supra note 17.
20. See supra note 16.
21. Morris, supra note 1, at 82-83, 86.
22. Id. Drawing from property law concepts, Professor Morris suggests those lacking
capacity for rational choice possess a "future interest" in personhood. Id. at 83.
1989]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
possess no right to punitive sanctions and may be subject only to ther-
apeutic ones.23
Moreover, the right to be punished does not require abandoning
attempts to rehabilitate within systems of punishment. As long as re-
habilitation programs are noncoercive, they are consistent with the of-
fender's right to be treated as a person.24 Indeed, extending offenders
an opportunity to make themselves "better persons" through rehabili-
tation programs administered in conjunction with punishment may
pay the highest homage to the values of personal dignity and individ-
ual integrity.
With these considerations in mind, the appeal of the right to be
punishdd becomes apparent. Given the alternatives of an indefinite
period of therapy or a given period of punishment, the right to be pun-
ished b~comes an important right that offenders may wish to assert.
Unlike therapeutic sanctions, punishment offers the offender opportu-
nities to plan his future accurately and to pay the price for his action
within a system that treats him as a responsible moral actor.
While much of Morris's theory contrasts the virtues of an ideal sys-
23. Prbfessor Morris specifically permits the use of "force and deception" with re-
spect to "children" and the "mentally ill." Id. at 82-83. He does not define "chil-
dren" or "mental illness," but presumably he is thinking primarily of individuals
lacking capacity to reason. Very young or mentally ill offenders are denied exer-
cise of their rights of personhood and hence their rights to be punished, because
they lack the "capacity to choose on the basis of reasons presented to them." Id. at
86. We all have an obligation "to respond to children in such a way as to maxi-
mize the chances of their becoming persons." Id. at 83. By the same token, society
has an obligation to provide treatment for mentally incapacitated individuals so
that they may be "[brought] back to the community of persons." Id. at 86. There-
fore, no loss of the right to be punished obtains where the state coercively
"treats" youthful offenders or those suffering from mental impairments so long
as they lack the capacity for rationality. Similarly, because the right to be pun-
ished is not triggered until an offender is found legally guilty, see supra note 5,
Morris's theory permits the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in seeking alter-
natives to criminal prosecution, including coercive therapeutic or preventive dis-
postions, for offenders who, for one reason or another, cannot be criminally
convicted.
24. Herbert Morris likely would agree with the following observations of his name-
sake, Norval Morris, regarding the relationship between rehabilitation and
imprisonment:
'Rehabilitation,' whatever it means and whatever the programs that
allegedly give it meaning, must cease to be a purpose of the prison sanc-
tion. This does not mean that the various developed treatment programs
within prisons need to be abandoned; quite the contrary, they need ex-
pansion. But it does mean that they must not be seen as purposive in the
sense that criminals are to be sent to prison for treatment. There is a
sharp distinction between the purposes of incarcertaion and the opportu-
nities for the training and assistance of prisoners that may be pursued
within those purposes. The system is corrupted when we fail to preserve
this distinction and this failure pervades the world's prison programs.
N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 14-15 (1974).
[Vol. 68:182
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tem of punishment against those of a totally therapeutic response to
deviancy, where those two approaches are the only alternatives,25 he
also argues that, whatever the alternatives, persons have a moral right
to be punished.2 6 Furthermore, this right is meaningful in the context
of our present, somewhat mixed, criminal justice system, which often
embraces aspects of both punishment and therapy.27
Not surprisingly, Morris's views have not escaped criticism. In par-
ticular, commentators object to his position that guilty offenders are
morally entitled to punishment, and only to punishment, when they
violate the law.28 Less controversial, however, is Morris's more mod-
erate claim that, if presented with coercive therapy as the only alter-
native to punishment, guilty offenders have a right to be punished.
Assuming that the right to be punished, at least in its less radical
form, is philosophically credible, it appears promising as a legal princi-
ple to illuminate certain problem areas of current criminal and mental
health law.29 The implications of the right to be punished are no less
significant in the context of juvenile justice. To appreciate this possi-
ble significance, it is first necessary to examine the general nature of
young people's rights.
III. THE RIGHTS OF YOUNG PEOPLE
While the courts have long dealt with various private law matters
involving children, the idea that kids might have legally enforceable
"civil" rights against the state, and even their parents, is relatively
new.30 It is now widely recognized, however, that children do possess
basic human, "civil" rights. Indeed, a veritable "children rights"
25. Morris, supra note 1, at 74-79.
26. Id. at 80.
27. Morris stated:
In the world as we now understand it, there are those who do wrong and
who have a right to be responded to as persons who have done wrong.
And there are those who have not done wrong but who are suffering
from illnesses that in a variety of ways interfere with their capacity to
live their lives as complete persons. These persons who are ill have a...
right to be treated as persons. When an individual is ill he is entitled to
that assistance which will make it possible for him to resume his func-
tioning as a person.
Id. at 86.
28. See, e.g., G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 417-18 (1978); Bedau, Retribu-
tion and the Theory of Punishment, 75 J. PHIL. 601, 617-18 & n.27 (1978); Wasser-
strom, Some Problems with Theories of Punishment, in JUSTICE AND
PUNISHMENT 173, 187-88, 191-94 (J. Cederblom & W. Blizek eds. 1977). See Hos-
pers, Retribution: The Ethics of Punishment, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL, 181,
184, 196-209 (R. Barnett & J. Hagel III eds. 1977).
29. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 854-61.
30. See W. WADLINGTON, C. WHITEBREAD & S. DAVIS, CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYS-
TEM 47-48 (1983) [hereinafter W. WADLINGTON].
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movement has emerged, 31 spawned by some, but by no means all, of
the United States Supreme Court cases in the area. 32 Although it may
now be conceded that young people have rights, the theoretical nature
of those rights remains controversial.33
A. Protection Rights
Under the predominant view, children's rights are based on no-
tions of protection. Minors, including adolescents, are considered to
be a class distinct from autonomous persons and thus not entitled to
the same civil rights enjoyed by adults. Rather, young people are enti-
tled to grow to maturity in an environment manifesting love, affec-
tion, discipline, guidance and any other factor conducive to the
development of those traits essential to responsible adulthood.34 Devi-
ant youngsters as "persons in the making" are considered appropriate
subject§ for treatment within the traditional, therapeutically oriented,
juvenile system.
1. The Traditional Juvenile Justice Movement
From early times, the law has differentiated violations of criminal
rules b children and those of their adult counterparts. 35 Until the
31. Id.
32. Two models of children's rights, the protectionist and personhood theories, exist.
See infra notes 34-69 and accompanying text. The question of whether the
Subreme Court has consistently embraced either theory is a matter largely be-
yond the scope of this Article but which, nevertheless, has beguiled the commen-
tators. Some see the Court's recent expansion of constitutional rights as
coAsistent with the protectionist position. See, e.g., Hafen, Developing Student
Expression Through Institutional Authority: Public Schools as Mediating Struc-
tures, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 663 (1987)[hereinafter Developing Student Expression];
Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations
Abbut Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 60 [hereinafter
Children's Liberation]. Other commentators read the Court's record as recogniz-
ing the personhood/autonomy theory, at least in certain circumstances. See, e.g.,
Richards, The Individual the Family and the Constitution: A Jurisprudential
Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 56 (1980).
For discussion of the Court's "children's rights" cases, see Gardner, Punitive
Juvenile Justice: Some Observations on a Recent Trend, 10 INT'L J.L. AND PSYCH.
129, 137-38 (1987) [hereinafter Punitive Juvenile Justice].
33. Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra note 32.
34. For development of the "protectionist" theory discussed in the text, see Develop.
ing Student Expression, supra note 32, and Children's Liberation, supra note 32.
35. Under Roman law, children enjoyed immunity from criminal liability until
reaching seven years of age. Ludwig, Rationale of Responsibility for Young Of-
fenders, 29 NEB. L. REV. 521, 525 (1950). While the Mosaic Code prescribed severe
penalties, including death, against children committing certain offenses against
their parents, the severity of these penalties was mitigated in practice and later
by explicit provision of the Talmud delimiting criminal responsibility through a
tripartite division of infancy (birth to six years), impubescence (seven years to
puberty), and adolescence (puberty to the age of majority-twenty years). F.
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nineteenth century, most legal systems dealt with youthful offender's
through the same criminal justice machinery applied to adults, but
recognized chronological age as the basis for a substantive defense 36 as
well as a ground for mitigating punishment.37
While juvenile law reform quietly began with New York's House of
Refuge in 1825, the creation of the first juvenile court system by the
Illinois legislature in 1899 immediately triggered a worldwide move-
ment. By 1945, every United States jurisdiction, state and federal, as
well as most European nations, followed the Illinois lead by creating
their own juvenile justice alternatives to the traditional criminal
law.38 These new systems handled the bulk of juvenile crime but, vir-
tually from their inception, provided mechanisms to "waive" juvenile
court jurisdiction in certain cases to the criminal courts.3 9 The juve-
LUDWIG, YouTH AND THE LAw 12-36 (1955). Children were afforded similar leni-
ency under Moslem law. Id.
In early English law, prior to its recognition as a substantive defense, infancy
operated as a basis for pardoning the actions of the offending child. Kean, The
History of the Criminal Liability of Children, 53 L.Q. REV. 364 (1937). By the
sixteenth century, the common-law infancy defense, see infra note 36, had taken
definite form. Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REv. 974, 1009 (1932). For an histori-
cal account of the infancy defense, see Woodbridge, Physical and Mental Infancy
in the Criminal Law, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 426-37 (1939). Many of the ideas in this
section of the Article are derived from Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra note 32.
36. Historically, no separate juvenile court existed. Recognizing that chil-
dren lack the adult measure of culpability, the common law embraced a
special doctrine for children, the infancy defense, which embodied a se-
ries of presumptions reflecting children's incapacity to take responsibil-
ity for their actions. Children under the age of seven were conclusively
presumed incapable of criminal responsibility while those over the age of
fourteen were regarded as adults and presumed capable of committing
crimes. Children between the ages of seven and fourteen presumptively
lacked criminal capacity and could be punished only if the state showed
that the child knew and understood the consequences of his act. There-
fore, for youths in this age group the state was required to show not only
that they committed the crime but also that they possessed the general
capacity to be responsible.
Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra note 32, at 144 (footnotes omitted).
37. See supra note 35. Until the first American juvenile court system in 1899,
"[c]hildren were dealt with on a relatively informal basis in the regular criminal
courts and children who exhibited antisocial behavior were often treated as being
dependent or neglected rather than as miniature criminals." Shepherd, Challeng-
ing the Rehabilitative Justification for Indeterminate Sentencing in the Juvenile
Justice System: The Right to Punishment, 21 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 12, 16 (1977).
"[C]olonial and post-colonial period sentencing practices appear to have shielded
most juveniles from especially harsh dispositions and included such 'creative sen-
tencing alternatives' as lengthy apprenticeships in lieu of strict reliance upon
more traditional penal sanctions." Thomas & Bilchik, Prosecuting Juveniles in
Criminal Courts: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 439, 444 n.12 (1985).
38. Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra note 32, at 129-30.
39. In 1903, only four years after its establishment, the Chicago Juvenile Court trans-
ferred 14 children to the adult criminal system. Wizner, Discretionary Waiver of
1989]
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nile court movement was founded on a promise to rehabilitate way-
ward youth by offering individualized and nonpunitive dispositions
according to the minor's needs40 without the encumbrances of the ad-
versarial model familiar to the criminal system.41 Under the guise of
parens patriae,42 juvenile court functionaries were to promote the
welfare of the offender,43 thus rendering unnecessary, indeed counter-
Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: An Invitation to Procedural Arbitrariness, 3 CRIM.
JUST. ETHICS 41, 42 (1984). That trend continued until by the 1970s every Ameri-
can jurisdiction had laws authorizing or requiring criminal prosecution of certain
minors in adult courts. Id. See also Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders for
Adult Prosecution: The Legislative Alternative to Asking Unanswerable Ques-
tions, 62 MINN. L. REV. 515, 516 n.5 (1978). While waiver is generally reserved for
those youths whose "highly visible, serious, or repetitive criminality raises legiti-
mate concern for public safety or community outrage," Feld, Juvenile Court Leg-
islative Reform and the Serious Young Offender: Dismantling the
"Rehabilitative Ideal", 65 MINN. L. REV. 165, 171 (1980) [hereinafter Juvenile
Court], many youths who commit minor offenses are dealt with in criminal court,
pet'haps because of the unavailability of fines as a juvenile court sanction.
Wizner, supra, at 44-45.
40. The fundamental concern of juvenile courts towards child offenders was with
"[w]hat is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his
int srest and in the interests of the state to save him from a downward career."
Mdck, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119-20 (1909). In adopting refor-
mation as its goal, the juvenile court movement eschewed retributivist notions of
guilt and blameworthiness. McCarthy, The Role of the Concept of Responsibility
in LJuvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 181, 207 (1977).
The rehabilitative objectives of the juvenile system were characterized by a
system of indeterminate sentencing in which type and duration of sanction were
dictated by the "best interests" of the offenders rather than the seriousness of the
offense. Wizner & Keller, The Penal Model of Juvenile Justice: Is Juvenile
Court Delinquency Jurisdiction Obsolete?, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1120, 1121 (1977).
41. The child--essentially good, as [the early reformers] saw it-was to be
made 'to feel that he is the object of [the state's] care and solicitude,' not
that he was under arrest or on trial. The rules of criminal procedure
were therefore altogether inapplicable. The apparent rigidities, techni-
calities, and harshness which they observed in both substantive and pro-
cedural criminal law were therefore to be discarded.... [T]he procedures
were to be 'clinical' rather than punitive.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967)(quoting Mack, supra note 40, at 120). The
infatuation with procedural informality was explained by an early court:
To save a child from becoming a criminal.., the legislature surely may
provide for the salvation of such a child.., by bringing it into one of the
courts of the state without any process at all .... When the child gets
there and the court, with the power to save it, determines on its salva-
tion, and not its punishment, it is immaterial how it got there.
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 53, 62 A. 198, 200 (1905)(emphasis added).
42. The English concept of parens patriae, applied historically by chancery courts,
permitted the court to exercise the Crown's paternal prerogative to declare a
child a ward of the Crown when the parents had failed to maintain the child's
welfare. S. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES 1-2 (2d ed. 1980). See generally Rendle-
man, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. REV. 205
(1971).
43. Parens patriae was the theoretical justification for coercive court commitments
[Vol. 68:182
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productive, the procedural protections of the criminal system.44
The juvenile court movement assumed that young people under an
articulated statutory age (sometimes as high as 21 years of age) are
incapable of rational decisionmaking and thus lack the capacity for
moral accountability assumed by the punitive model. Under this view,
youthful offenders are entitled to help, not punishment, and the state
as a benign parent should intervene until its help is no longer neces-
sary, even if that requires institutionalizing the youth in the state "re-
form school" for the entire period of his minority.
2. The Right to Rehabilitation
Assuming that punishment in and of itself carries no inherent
therapeutic benefit,45 the right to be punished cannot be found within
the protectionist tradition that defines the nature of juvenile offend-
ers' rights in terms of the rehabilitative ideal. Statutes routinely artic-
for both neglected and criminal children. Early juvenile justice theory drew no
distinction between offending and victimized children. Fox, Juvenile Justice Re-
for= An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN L. REV. 1187, 1192-93 (1970).
44. See supra note 41. In extolling the virtues of a procedurally flexible juvenile
court, Chief Justice Burger argued that the "sensitive problems of youthful of-
fenders" should be dealt with through "benevolent and less formal means than
criminal courts" which "traumatize" youthful offenders. In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 376 (1970)(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Professor Barry Feld summarized the
traditional rationale for, and the extent of, relaxed procedure in juvenile court:
In distinguishing children from adult offenders, the juvenile court...
rejected the procedures of criminal prosecution. It introduced a euphe-
mistic vocabulary and a physically separate court building to avoid the
stigma of adult prosecutions, and it modified courtroom procedures to
eliminate any implication of a criminal proceeding. For example, pro-
ceedings were initiated by a petition in the welfare of the child, rather
than by a criminal complaint. Because the important issues involved the
child's background and welfare rather than the commission of a specific
crime, courts dispensed with juries, lawyers, rules of evidence, and for-
mal procedures. To avoid stigmatization, hearings were confidential and
private, access to court records was limited, and youths were found to be
"delinquent" rather than guilty of an offense. To make proceedings
more personal and private, the judge was supposed to sit next to the
child while court personnel presented a treatment plan to meet the
child's needs as determined by a background investigation identifying
the sources of the child's misconduct. Dispositions were indeterminate
and nonproportional and could continue for the duration of minority.
The events that brought the child before the court affected neither the
degree nor the duration of intervention because each child's needs dif-
fered and no limits could be defined in advance. The dispositional pro-
cess was designed to determine why the child was in court in the first
instance and what could be done to change the character, attitude, and
behavior of the youth to prevent a reappearance.
Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court,
69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 150-51 (1984)(footnotes omitted).
45. Indeed, the traditional juvenile court wisdom is that punishment is antithetical to
the aims of the rehabilitative ideal. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
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ulate "rehabilitation" as the goal of juvenile justice, thus creating, in
the eyes of some courts, "rights" to such dispositions.46 Occasionally,
theorists argue that youthful offenders possess rights to rehabilitation
irrespective of any statutorily created interests. 47 Such views suggest
that subjecting young people to punishment violates a basic prima fa-
cie human right to be "helped" rather than made to suffer the un-
pleasant effects of punishment.48
B. Personhood Rights
In contrast to the protectionist rights view, a quite different theory
of children's rights recently has emerged. Recent social science litera-
ture suggests that adolescents4 9 may be able to make rational decisions
as effectively as adults.5 0 Studies of adolescents' judgments about
medical and psychiatric treatment, abortion, and consent to partici-
pate in research show little difference between adult and adolescent
decisiortmaking.51 Moreover, various studies indicate that most ado-
46. See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974).
47. Judge Skelly Wright, for example, appears to have accepted the notion that
juvtniles have a constitutional right to therapeutic, nonpunitive dispositions.
BaAed on his view that procedural due process requires certain protections prior
to Waivers to criminal court, Judge Wright opposes "legislative waivers" which
permit prosecutors to bring certain defined classes of offenses in criminal court
without affording the juvenile an opportunity to show that juvenile court disposi-
tioif is appropriate. See United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1338-50 (D.C. Cir.
1972)(Wright, J., dissenting). In order for procedural protections to be required,
some constitutionally recognizable substantive interest must be offended by legis-
lative waivers. Application of due process requires a "two-stage analysis: We
must first ask whether the asserted individual interests are encompassed within
the [due process clauses'] protection of 'life, liberty, or property'; if protected in-
terests are implicated, we then must decide what procedures constitute 'due pro-
cess of law.'" Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977). Presumably,
therefore, Judge Wright must have in mind some substantive "liberty" or "prop-
erty" interest of minors, not just statutorily created but grounded in the Constitu-
tion itself, in having their cases disposed of in juvenile court. The most plausible
substantive interest is perhaps a juvenile "right to rehabilitation." Without such
a substantive interest, his procedural due process considerations could never be
triggered.
48. Defenders of the right to rehabilitation often recognize that if proper procedural
protections are afforded, juveniles may be "waived" from juvenile to criminal
court. See supra note 47. The right to rehabilitation is thus best understood as a
prima facie right to non-punitive, rehabilitative disposition within the juvenile
system.
49. While "adolescence" often is defined as the period between puberty and the age
of majority, see, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 45 (5th ed. 1979), it is also some-
times understood both as a period and a transition, a term of years when those
not yet adult are engaged in the process of becoming an adult. F. ZIMRING, THE
CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE x (1982).
50. The social science data are summarized in Melton, Developmental Psychology
and the Law, The State of the Art, 22 J. FAM. L. 445, 462-66 (1984).
51. These studies also are summarized by Professor Gary Melton. Id.; Melton, Mak-
[Vol. 68:182
THE RIGHT TO BE PUNISHED
lescents, unlike most pre-adolescent children, possess the same moral
reasoning skills as adults.5 2 Such data has influenced some commen-
tators to urge that "the law should accord the considered choices of
competent adolescents the same treatment it accords similar choices
of adults."5 3 In any event, the social science data gives credibility to
the notion that adolescent youngsters should indeed have a right to be
held accountable for their acts of delinquency.5 4
1. The New Juvenile Justice
For a variety of reasons, the traditional rehabilitative model of ju-
venile justice recently has taken on markedly punitive aspects.5 5 A
revolution in substantive theory presently is occurring as various ju-
risdictions express disenchantment with the rehabilitative ideal and
embrace punitive sanctions for youthful offenders.S Principles of
ing Room for Psychology in Miranda Doctrine: Juveniles' Waiver of Rights, 7 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 67, 81-82 (1984) [hereinafter Making Room]. In the last cited
work, Melton discusses Professor Thomas Grisso's "enigmatic" research which,
apparently contrary to the conclusions of other studies, finds that juveniles are
less able than adults to appreciate the meaning of certain legal principles, particu-
larly Miranda rights. Making Room, supra at 81.
52. See generally Batey, The Rights of Adolescents, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 363
(1982).
53. Id. at 373.
54. "Psychological research concerning legal socialization, internalization of social
and legal expectations, and ethical decision making... indicates that by about age
fourteen a youth has acquired most of the legal and moral values that will guide
his behavior through later life." Feld, The Decision to Seek Criminal Charges:
Just Deserts and the Waiver Decision, 3 CRIM. JUsT. ETHICS 27, 37 (1984). There-
fore, some conclude: "There is no compelling or convincing evidence that persons
[in late adolescence] differ significantly from persons [over the age of majority] in
their capacity to understand the outcomes and consequences of their acts....
[S]erious crime should be treated seriously regardless of the offender's age."
Confronting Youth Crime, Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on
Sentencing Policy Toward Young Offenders 25 (1978).
55. Four factors account for the shift toward punitive juvenile justice: (1) the
Supreme Court's criminalization of juvenile courts; (2) a general rebirth of retrib-
utive theories of punishment throughout the legal system; (3) an expanded view
of children's capacity for responsibility; and (4) perceived increases in the rate of
serious crime committed by juveniles. Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra note 32,
at 133-40.
56. Punitive theory is manifested by the movement towards holding juveniles ac-
countable for their delinquent acts through proportioning sanctions to the seri-
ousness of the offense. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.010(2)(c) & (d) (West
Supp. 1988) (which aims, inter alia, to "[m]ake the juvenile offender accountable
for his or her criminal behavior" by "[p]rovid[ing] for punishment commensurate
with the age, crime, and criminal history of the juvenile offender"). See also
MINN. STAT. § 260.011(2) (West Supp. 1980)(which seeks, inter alia, to "develop
individual responsibility for lawful behavior"); Dawson, The Third Justice Sys-
tem. The New Juvenile-Criminal System of Determinate Sentencing for the
Youthful Violent Offender in Texas, 19 ST. MARY's L.J. 943 (1988)(new determi-
nate sentencing scheme for juvenile courts in Texas which imposes determinate
1989]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
personal responsibility and accountability, foreign to the earlier prem-
ises of juvenile justice,5 7 now are routinely coming to the forefront as
offending minors receive their "just deserts"58 through "determinate
sentencing"59 systems that proportion punishment to the gravity of
their offenses. In light of those developments, some leading commen-
tators advocate the demise of juvenile court jurisdiction in delin-
quency cases and seek a return to a single criminal system for adults
and minors alike.60
sentencing for six serious, violent offenses). For a discussion of New York's move
towards a system of punishment, see Note, Rehabilitation vs. Punishment: A
Comparative Analysis of the Juvenile Justice Systems in Massachusetts and New
York, 21 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1091, 1107-15 (1987). For a detailed list of jurisdic-
tions adopting punitive, or partially punitive, models of juvenile justice, see Walk-
over, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REV. 503, 523
n.82 (1984). The standards promulgated by the Joint Commission on Juvenile
Justice of the American Bar Association and the Institute of Judicial Administra-
tion systematically reject rehabilitation as the primary goal of the juvenile justice
system and adopt instead, inter alia, as a general purpose "to reduce juvenile
crime by maintaining the integrity of the substantive law proscribing certain be-
hazior and by developing individual responsibility for lawful behavior." INSTI-
TUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION & AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE
JUSTICE STANDARDS, DISPOSITIONS 1.1, at 5 (1980)[hereinafter STANDARDS]. For
commentary on the STANDARDS, see McCarthy, Delinquency Dispositions Under
the Juvenile Justice Standards: The Consequences of a Change of Rationale, 52
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1093 (1977); Wizner & Keller, supra note 40.
57. See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text.
58. The term "just deserts" describes the retributive justice model of punishment
which proportions sanctions to the gravity of offense. See generally A. VON
HIRSCH, supra note 1. While the sentencing aims of the juvenile penal codes sel-
dom expressly define sentencing policy in terms of the "just deserts" rubric, the
concept seems implicit in many of the requirements for proportionality. E.g.,
STANDARDS, supra note 56, 2.1, at 6 ("In choosing among statutornly permissible
dispositions, the court should employ the least restrictive ... disposition that is
appropriate to the seriousness of the offense, as modified by the degree of culpa-
bility")(emphasis added); MINN. STAT. § 260.011(2) (West Supp. 1988). It must be
emphasized, however, that none of the new juvenile justice models totally reject
such utilitarian concerns as deterrence, incapacitation, and even rehabilitation
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.010(2)(a), (f), (g) & (j) (West Supp. 1988)(in
addition to any retributive considerations, the system must "[p]rotect the citi-
zenry from criminal behavior, provide community-based dispositions whenever
'consistent with public safety.' and respond to the needs of youthful offenders").
59. As used in this Article, the term "determinate sentencing" refers to legislatively
determining punishment in either a fixed or narrowly variable term in reference
to the offense. Thus, the discretion of judges, other sentencing authorities, and
correctional authorities is vastly curtailed, if not eliminated altogether. See gen-
erally Gardner, The Determinate Sentencing Movement and the Eighth Amend-
ment: Excessive Punishment Before and After Rummel v. Estelle, 1980 DUKE L.J.
1103.
60. N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT To BE DIFFERENT 107 (1971); Juvenile Court, supra note
39, at 242; Fox, Abolishing the Juvenile Court, HARV. L. SCH. BULL. 22 (Spring
1977); McCarthy, supra note 56, at 1116-17; Wizner & Keller, supra note 40, at
1132-35.
[Vol. 68:182
THE RIGHT TO BE PUNISHED
The new juvenile justice reflects a general disillusionment with the
ability of the juvenile justice system to live up to its traditional reha-
bilitative promise. Because punishment is justifiable only if its recipi-
ent is a "person" capable of moral agency, the movement toward a
punitive model seriously questions the existing view that juveniles
lack capacity for rational decisionmaking.
2. The Right to be Punished
Recognizing that adolescents possess capacity for rational decision-
making means that they meet the qualifications for "personhood" and
thus are entitled to punishment for their culpable offenses. 6 ' While
the right to be punished requires holding adolescents accountable for
their offenses, the extent of their accountability generally should not
be synonymous with that of similarly situated adult offenders. 62 De-
velopmental differences generally render adolescent persons less cul-
pable or criminally responsible than their adult counterparts.63
Adolescent persons lack life experience and thus might best be viewed
as "semi-autonomous," 64 "incomplete adults."65 It is therefore unreal-
61. Professor Morris likely would agree with the conclusion in the text. Even for
children not yet "persons," Morris has advocated the right to be punished:
There is an obligation imposed upon on us all, unlike that we have with
respect to animals, to respond to children in such a way as to maximize
the chances of their becoming persons. This may well impose upon us
the obligation to treat them as persons from a very early age, that is, to
respect their choices and to place upon them the responsibility for the
choices to be made. There is no need to say that there is a close connec-
tion between how we respond to them and what they become. It also
imposes upon us all the duty to display constantly the qualities of a per-
son, for what they become they will largely become because of what they
learn from us is acceptable behavior.
Morris, supra note 1, at 83.
62. In situations justifying "waiver" to the criminal system, see supra note 39, youth-
ful offenders may be punished similarly to adults. But see Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988)(holding that an offender could not be executed
for a crime he committed at age fifteen).
63. After reviewing the social science literature on the subject, one commentator
concluded: "[A]dolescent children may be generally regarded as possessing the
capacity to be culpable, although quite often not at the level one would expect of
a mature adult." Walkover, supra note 56, at 543. Thus, the social science re-
search, see supra text accompanying notes 49-54, establishes that children, at least
by adolescence, may justifiably be held accountable for their delinquent acts but,
because they lack important life experience, not to the extent of responsibility
extended to adult criminals. See also Lasswell & Donnelly, The Continuing De-
bate Over Responsibility: An Introduction to Isolating the Condemnation Sanc-
tion, 68 YALE L.J. 869, 884-85 (1959); Zimring, Pursuing Juvenile Justice:
Comments on Some Recent Reform Proposals, 55 J. OF URB. L. 631, 643-45 (1978).
64. F. ZIMRING, supra note 49, at 99-116.
65. "Juveniles may be viewed as incomplete adults, lacking in full moral and experi-
ential development." STANDARDS, supra note 56, at 19 n.5 (quoting Cohen, Posi-
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istic and unfair to hold them to adult responsibility standards. As
Franklin Zimring stated:
To impose full responsibility because adolescents have begun to make life
choices is much like expecting every new bride to be an instant Betty
Crocker.... [Juvenile offenders must be protected from the full burden of
adult responsibility while being] pushed along by degrees toward the moral
and legal accountability that we consider appropriate to adulthood.
6 6
Persons possess the right to punishment proportionate to the seri-
ousness of their offenses, taking into account individual culpability
factors. Given their semi-autonomous status, adolescent persons,
therefore, possess the right to punishment but to punishment scaled
down from that imposed upon adults. In the capital punishment con-
text, the Supreme Court recently precluded use of the death penalty
upon an offender who committed his crime while only fifteen years
old. A plurality of the Court said: "[T]he experience of mankind, as
well as the long history of our law, [reveals] that the normal 15-year-
old is not prepared to assume the full responsibilities of an adult."67
These considerations support the view that adolescent persons pos-
sess a right to be punished but, except in cases appropriately "waived"
to criminal court,68 less severely than similarly situated adults. To
avoid undue stigma associated with the adult "criminal" system, pun-
ishment for juvenile delinquency should occur within a separate sys-
tem. As the author has noted elsewhere:
Assuming that youthful offenders are less culpable than their adult counter-
parts, they should no more be saddled with the same stigma imposed upon
adult offenders than with the same punishment. While being branded 'delin-
quent' by a punitive juvenile system is surely stigmatic, it may well carry
fewer negative connotations, both in the minds of offenders and to the com-
munity at large, than flow from being convicted a 'criminal' by the adult
court.
6 9
Moreover, if incarceration is to be the form of punishment,7 0 respect
for adolescent personhood may require confinement separate from
adult offenders given the risks of exploitation, sexual and otherwise,
of youthful offenders at the hands of physically stronger, adult fellow-
inmates.
tion Paper (Juvenile Justice Standards Project, No. 18, 1974)). See F. ZIMRING,
supra note 49, at 21, 89-98.
66. F. ZIMRING, supra note 49, at 95-96.
67. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2693 (1988).
68. See supra note 39.
69. Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra note 32, at 148-49.
70. Because incarceration is costly, both in humanitarian and economic terms, it
should be imposed only where less onerous forms of punishment (probation,
house arrest, fines, restitution, etc.) are inadequate to achieve the purposes un-
derlying the punitive sanction. See N. MORRIs, supra, note 24, at 58-84.
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C. Accommodating Protection and Personhood Rights
The discussion thus far has suggested that juvenile offenders may
possess two kinds of seemingly conflicting rights: protection rights to
rehabilitation and personhood rights to be punished. In fact, however,
the two kinds of rights may be accommodated.
Pre-adolescent offenders often lack capacity to take responsibility
for their actions.T1 In the absence of such capacity, they cannot justly
be punished72 and must be dealt with by the state therapeutically, if at
all.73 Likewise, adolescent offenders who lack normal competency for
rational choice are not entitled to personhood rights and instead pos-
sess whatever rights protectionist theory entails. Adolescent "per-
sons," on the other hand, possess the right to be punished in lieu of
being rehabilitated.
Consistent with the theory of personhood, youths possessing the
right to be punished may choose not to assert their right. They may,
for example, choose to accept a rehabilitative or therapeutic disposi-
tion in lieu of a punitive one if the state offers such nonpunitive alter-
natives. "Waivers" of, or failures to assert, the right to be punished
are not inconsistent with Professor Morris's description of the "ina-
lienable" right to be treated as a person.74 What cannot be "alienated"
is the right to be treated as a rational being whose choices are
respected.75 So long as an offender competently and rationally
chooses to accept a nonpunitive disposition, no violation of his right to
be treated as a person exists. If the offender competently chooses to
withdraw a waiver once made and to assert his right to be punished, he
should be permitted to do so. Because the offender's initial waiver of
the right to be punished would have rendered his nonpunitive deten-
tion essentially consensual, his desire to withdraw his waiver and to
assert his punishment right would invalidate his consent. If the period
of nonpunitive detention has exceeded that which could have been im-
71. "Review of [the social science data] confirms our intuitive and experiential judg-
ments concerning children.... [I]t can safely be said that unlike an adult, a pre-
adolescent's capacity to be culpable cannot be assumed." Walkover, supra note
56, at 543.
72. See Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra note 32, at 143-46.
73. This Article takes no position on the question of whether or not protection rights
entail a right to rehabilitative disposition for juvenile offenders who do not qual-
ify for the right to be punished.
74. Although presumably one could not waive the right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishments and thereby consent to inhuman or barbaric punishments,
see Note, In Defense of BehaviorModificationfor Prisoners: Eighth Amendment
Considerations, 18 ARiz. L. REV. 110, 141 (1976), waiver of an eighth amendment
right to be punished would appear to be constitutionally permissible as long as it
was made competently, especially if the offender is offered an opportunity to re-
ceive meaningful therapy. See infra notes 91-110 and accompanying text; Note,
supra, at 140-45.
75. See Morris, supra note 1, at 83-85.
1989]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
posed as punishment, he should be freed immediately. If the period of
nonpunitive detention has not exceeded the term set for punishment,
the offender should be punished no more than the set period
remaining.76
IV. A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PUNISHED? 77
A leading constitutional scholar has suggested that a fundamental
purpose of our constitutional scheme is the "preservation of 'those at-
tributes of an individual which are irreducible in his selfhood."' 78 In-
herent in such purpose is the protection of an unarticulated "right of
personhood," manifested by "the obviously incomplete listing in the
Bill of Rights" and woven throughout the "spirit and structure" of the
Constittition's "spare text."79
GivEn such an understanding of the Constitution and assuming
that Morris's moral theory is sound, it is logical to suggest that the
right to be punished, because it is an aspect of the right to be treated as
a persoh, might itself be an interest worthy of constitutional protec-
tion.80 Although such protection apparently has never been recog-
76. Unless credit is given for the period the offender has been nonpunitively de-
tained, he might be penalized for his waiver of this right to be punished. For
example, an offender who could be punished for a maximum of one year for his
offense might actually be restricted for three years if he is given a full one-year
sentence when he asserts his right to be punished after having accepted two years
of compulsory therapy in lieu of punishment. To the extent that it is desirable
for offenders in certain circumstances to accept therapy in lieu of punishment,
waivers of the right to be punished should be encouraged and not penalized.
77. Much of the ensuing discussion of constitutional rights is derived from the
author's earlier work. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 846-54.
78. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 889 (1978)(quoting Freund, 52 ALI
ANN. MT. 42-43 (1975)).
79. Id. at 893.
80. The following seems particularly relevant in the context of the right to be pun-
ished as that right conflicts with state impositions of coercive therapy:
The very idea of a fundamental right of personhood rests on the convic-
tion that, even though one's identity is constantly and profoundly shaped
by the rewards and penalties, the exhortations and scarcities and con-
straints of one's social environment, the "personhood" resulting from
this process is sufficiently "one's own" to be deemed fundamental in con-
frontation with the one entity that retains a monopoly over legitimate
violence-the government. Thus active coercion by government ... to
alter a person's being, or deliberate neglect by government which per-
mits a being to suffer, are conceived as qualitatively different from the
passive, incremental coercion that shapes all of life and for which no one
bears precise responsibility.
Although relevant factors can be identified, neither the artistry nor
the archaeology of constitutional doctrine can determine finally the ex-
tent to which such a right of personhood... can be asserted against gov-
ernmental control or deliberate governmental indifference.
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nized, it could sensibly be generated under a variety of theories.8 1 Yet
the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the eighth amendment,
because it is the only Bill of Rights text specifically dealing with sub-
stantive rights regarding punishment and because it has been a partic-
ularly rich source of creative constitutional law,82 seems the most
plausible place to find constitutional underpinnings for the right to be
punished.
The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted." 83 Although the amendment traditionally has been
read as creating a right in criminal offendersS4 to be free from certain
kinds, and perhaps excessive degrees, of punishment,8 5 its text cer-
tainly does not foreclose a corresponding right in such offenders to
receive "noncruel and usual punishments."
It is probably impossible to prove that the drafters of the eighth
amendment intended it to establish a basis for the right to be pun-
ished, although, as discussed below, neither can it be proven that the
amendment's authors rejected, or necessarily would have rejected,
such a reading. Moreover, the underlying values protected by the
amendment, as well as at least one Supreme Court case to be analyzed
later, give positive support for the right. At the outset, however, it
should be noted that the eighth amendment discussion which follows
is not intended to be a thorough exploration of the possible eighth
amendment roots of the right to be punished. Rather, the attempt
here is merely to suggest a tentative constitutional basis for the right.
Id. at 890.
Another commentator suggested a legal right somewhat similar to Professor
Morris's right to be punished, stating.
The structure of the criminal justice system leaves intact the individual's
ability to disobey the law and take the consequences. Participation in
this system on the same terms as one's fellow citizens is a legal right. I
would say not that the society necessarily recognizes a moral right to
disobey the law and take the consequences, but rather that the structure
of the criminal justice system recognizes the possibility of such a right in
every set of circumstances.
Burns, Behavior Modifcation as a Punishment, 22 AM. J. JURIS. 19, 34 (1977).
81. Substantive due process would be a leading candidate. See L. TRIBE, supra note
78, at 893-96. Another basis might be the "penumbra of rights" theory expressed
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
82. "[The eighth amendment] has become one of the new frontiers of creative consti-
tutional law." L. BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
xiii (1975).
83. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
84. Whether the framers wished to restrict the eighth amendment to criminal con-
texts is subject to controversy. See Rosenberg, Ingraham v. Wright: The Supreme
Court's Whipping Boy, 78 CoLUM. L. REv. 75, 76-80 (1978).
85. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted, " The Original Mean-
ing, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 839 (1969).
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A. Eighth Amendment Legislative History
The legislative history of the eighth amendment is scant, and what
little exists generally is vague and equivocal.8 6 The history shows that
the amendment primarily was meant to limit punishment.87 It ap-
pears, therefore, that the framers did not explicitly incorporate a right
to be punished into the eighth amendment.
To suggest that something like Morris's theory simply might have
been taken for granted by the framers may not be entirely fanciful.
Ideas similar to Morris's were being expressed by Immanuel Kant at
roughly the time the eighth amendment was debated and enacted,88
and thus possibly could have been a part of the consciousness of the
constitutional drafters.8 9 Moreover, the therapeutic and rehabilitative
86. Rosenberg, supra note 84, at 79-80.
87. SeP generally Granucci, supra note 85; see also Radin, The Jurisprudence of
Ddath: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126
U. PA. L. REV. 989, 992-95 (1978).
88. Although Kant apparently did not specifically espouse a right to be punished, he
did emphasize the right to be treated as a person. "[R]ational beings ... are called
peJ-sons, because their very nature points them out as ends in themselves, that is,
as something which must not be used merely as means, and so far therefore re-
stricts freedom of action (and is an object of respect)." I. Kant, Fundamental
Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, in THE ESSSENTIAL KANT 295, 330 (A.
Zx'eig ed. 1970). Kant related the right to be treated as a person to the context of
punishment:
[Judicial] punishment can never be administered merely as a means for
promoting another Good either with regard to the Criminal himself or to
Civil Society, but must in all cases be imposed only because the individ-
ual on whom it is inflicted has committed a Crime. For one man ought
never to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the purpose of
another, nor be mixed up with the subjects of Real Right. Against such
treatment his Inborn Personality has a Right to protect him, even
although he may be condemned to lose his Civil Personality. He must
first be found guilty and punishable, before there can be any thought of
drawing from his Punishment any benefit for himself or his fellow-citi-
zens. The Penal Law is a Categorical Imperative; and woe to him who
creeps through the serpent-windings of Utilitarianism to discover some
advantage that may discharge him from the Justice of Punishment, or
even from the due measure of it.
I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195 (W. Hastie trans. 1887)(lst ed. 1796).
89. Professor David Richards suggests that in drafting the Bill of Rights the framers
intended to express a "radical vision of ... rights" in order to give life to the
"moral implications of human personality." Richards, supra note 32, at 6-7. The
Constitution was conceived as a means of protecting, personal autonomy, "the
central value of moral personality." Id. at 8. Such a view of man, traced directly
to Kant and others, repudiates the paternalism of Plato's "therapeutic state,"
which permitted the "benevolent physician" to "completely control the life of the
disabled patient." Id. at 6-14. Guilty offenders' assertions of a right to be punished
for their offenses, at least as opposed to being "treated" for them, thus would
seem perfectly consistent with, indeed required by, the theory of human auton-
omy and personal responsibility embraced by the founding fathers.
Some of Kant's more particular views on punishment also might have shaped
American punishment theory at the time the eighth amendment was drafted. See
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approach toward crime was essentially a nineteenth-century phenom-
enon.90 Therefore, punishment of criminal offenders probably was
the only available alternative at the time the eighth amendment was
adopted.9 1 If so, the constitutional drafters would have found no need
to specify constitutional protection of the right to be punished, how-
ever central such a concept might have been. Perhaps this explains
why it was not until the nineteenth-century advent of "the rehabilita-
tive ideal" that the right to be punished was first explicitly articulated
by Hegel. 92
If these historical considerations are plausible for adults, they are
equally so for juvenile offenders who were dealt with exclusively
within the criminal system at the time the Bill of Rights was drafted.
Subject to the defense of infancy, which would render most adoles-
cents liable for punishment,93 youthful offenders were subjected to
the same system of sanctions imposed upon adult offenders.
B. Eighth Amendment Values
Although an eighth amendment right to be punished may find no
Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment" An Examination of the
Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838, 845-47, 853-55 (1972)(the principle of
proportioning punishment to offense, a central concept of Kantian, as well as of
utilitarian philosophy of punishment, "stands as the underlying principle most
surely relied upon by the [eighth] amendment's framers"). Kant's lex talionis
theory also seems to have found American expression in the ideas of Thomas
Jefferson. See Kaufman, Retribution and the Ethics of Punishment, in ASSESS-
ING THE CRIMINAL 211, 223 (R. Barnett & J. Hagel eds. 1977).
90. See Dershowitz, Background Paper, in Fair and Certain Punishment, Report of
the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing 83, 84 (1976).
See also D. ROTHMAN, THE DIscovERY OF THE ASYLUM 3-56 (1971). In the Jackso-
nian period, a widespread move toward the therapeutic and rehabilitative treat-
ment of criminal offenders began. The Jacksonian notion of the perceived causes
of crime and deviant behavior contrasted sharply with the Calvinist view of the
depraved nature of man held by earlier colonists. See id. at 57-108; Dershowitz,
supra, at 85-91. See also H. BARNES, THE STORY OF PUNISHMENT 113-49 (rev. 2d
ed. 1972).
91. As David J. Rothman notes, "[tihe two most widely used penalties in the eight-
eenth century were the fine and the whip." D. ROTHMAN, supra note 90, at 48. He
also points out that only
[r]arely ... did the statutes rely upon institutionalization. A sentence of
imprisonment was uncommon, never used alone. Local jails held men
caught up in the process of judgment, not those who had completed it;
persons awaiting trial, those convicted but not yet punished, debtors who
had still to meet their obligations. The idea of serving time in a prison as
a method of correction was the invention of a later generation.
Id. See also Dershowitz, supra note 90, at 83.
92. See Hegel, Punishment as a Right, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1,
at 107. Hegel's theory concerning the right to be punished appeared in his The
Philosophy of Right, first published in 1821. See 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL 435
(1972).
93. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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direct support from legislative history, it fares better when considered
in light of the values and policies underlying the cruel and unusual
punishments clause. Indeed, the Supreme Court seems to have given
explicit recognition to the principle that punishment must be consis-
tent with one's right to be treated as a person. In Trop v. Dulles,94 the
Court considered the eighth amendment constitutionality of punish-
ing the crime of wartime desertion with the penalty of denationaliza-
tion. A four-justice plurality of the Court articulated the fundamental
value protected by the amendment: "The basic concept underlying
the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man."95
Commentators have identified the eighth amendment's protection of
human dignity as "bottomed on a moral obligation of each person [as
well as the state] to treat others as persons, with the kind of equal
concern and respect that we call 'human' or 'humane.' "96 Moreover,
the Trop plurality recognized a dynamic character to the eighth
amendment text, stating that "the words of the Amendment are not
precise, and ... their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw
its meahing from the evolving standards of decency that mark the pro-
gress ok a maturing society." 97 Whatever its historical meaning, the
amendment assures that punishments will be administered in a man-
ner consistent with the current understanding of what it means to be a
person. Although the amendment always has been viewed as a limita-
tion on punishment, there seems to be no necessary reason to deny its
application to support an entitlement to be punished if the state is dis-
regardihg the personhood of offenders through nonpunitive responses.
The eighth amendment claim suggested here provides the guilty of-
fender with a constitutional right to be punished that may well over-
ride whatever interest the state has in administering therapy.9 8 The
offender is entitled to be humanely punished; rejecting his assertion of
this entitlement would constitute a denial of his personhood.99
C. Robinson v. California: A Case for Consideration
A single United States Supreme Court case will be offered in sup-
port of an eighth amendment right to be punished. In Robinson v.
94. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
95. Id. at 100 (plurality opinion).
96. Radin, supra note 87, at 1044.
97. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion).
98. The right to be punished could be overridden by the need to impose coercive ther-
apeutic sanctions if, but only if, the government could show compelling reason.
See infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
99. The right to be punished is satisfied by the receipt of legally prescribed punish-
ment, whatever its form or duration. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying
text. Certainly incarceration need not be the only form of punishment imposed.
Fines and even probation, where its conditions manifest a punitive sanction, see
supra note 10, could satisfy the offender's right to be punished.
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California,00 the Court struck down as cruel and unusual punish-
ment a California statute that punished drug addiction with a sentence
of ninety days to one year in the county jail. The statute violated the
eighth amendment because it punished the status of being a drug ad-
dict instead of requiring a specific criminal act.1 01 The Court recog-
nized addiction to narcotics as an "illness"10 2  which, while
nonpunishable, could be dealt with permissibly through compulsory
therapy.
The Court offered little explanation of why punishing Robinson
under the California statute offended the eighth amendment. Clearly,
it was not because the form of punishment, incarceration, was uncon-
stitutionally cruel. 0 3 Nor did the Court seriously argue that the un-
constitutionality consisted in the excessiveness of the punishment.
"To be sure," said the Court, "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in
the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But the
question cannot be considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison
would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a
common cold."104 The problem was not so much that ninety days was
t6o much punishment for the "crime," but rather that punishment, in
any form or degree, was simply inappropriate and irrational in the
Robinson context.105
100. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
101. Id. at 666-67. The majority did not discuss the problem of distinguishing "status"
and "act." In his dissenting opinion, however, Justice White faulted the act-status
distinction, arguing that the conviction of Robinson, an addict, rested upon the
"acts" of using drugs that were necessarily subsumed in his status as an "addict."
Id. at 686 (White, J., dissenting). Similarly, in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514
(1968), which addressed the issue of whether the eighth amendment prevents the
conviction of a chronic alcoholic for being drunk in public, Justice White said:
"Analysis of this difficult case is not advanced by preoccupation with the label
'condition'.... 'Being' drunk in public is not far removed in time from the acts of
'getting' drunk and 'going' into public." Id. at 550 n.2 (White, J., concurring).
102. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). The Court noted the "illness" of
drug addiction may be contracted involuntarily, presumably recognizing that it is
also often contracted through the addict's voluntary use of drugs. Apparently,
the Robinson Court considered it unimportant whether the addiction was ac-
quired innocently or voluntarily. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514,542 n.3 (1968)
(Black, J., concurring).
103. The defense argued that imprisonment of the drug addict would be cruel and
unusual because it would impose "intense mental and physical torment and suf-
fering; via the 'cold turkey' withdrawal method." Brief for Appellant at 30,
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
104. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
105. Yet Justice Douglas suggested that Robinson is really an excessive punishment
case. Id. at 676 (Douglas, J., concurring). "[T]he principle that would deny power
to exact capital punishment for a petty crime would also deny power to punish a
person by fine or imprisonment for being sick." Id. Others see Robinson as a
substantive due process case masquerading in eighth amendment garb. For ex-
ample, Justice White said:
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The emphasis in Robinson thus is not so much toward the cruelty
of the punishment, as determined by traditional eighth amendment
attention to its modes and degrees,O6 as it is toward its rationality.
Because punishment is necessarily tied to a criminal act, 0 7 and not to
a status, it made no sense to punish Robinson. But more than concep-
tual anomaly was at stake. Punishment of Robinson merely because
of his status can be viewed as a violation of his right to be treated as a
person and to be punished only upon a showing that he had committed
an unlawful act. Whereas compulsory therapy or preventive deten-
tion would not necessarily have entailed an infringement of Robin-
son's personhood,10s punishment clearly would have.
Such an understanding of Robinson provides a basis for an eighth
amendment right to be punished in cases where the offender has been
convicted of a criminal act. If one's right to personhood is violated
upon pumishment even when no criminal act was committed, the same
eighth amendment interest might be violated if nonpunitive disposi-
tions, in lieu of punishment, are administered when a person has been
convicted of a criminal act.109
Case exegesis aside, a right to punishment for youthful offenders
I deem this application of 'cruel and unusual punishment' so novel that I
suspect the Court was hard put to find a way to ascribe to the Framers of
the Constitution the result reached today rather than to its own notions
of ordered liberty. If this case involved economic regulation, the present
Court's allergy to substantive due process would surely save the statute
and prevent the Court from imposing its own philosophical predilections
upon state legislatures or Congress.
Id. at 689 (White, J., dissenting). See also Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme
Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 107, 147-48 & n.144.
For a discussion of the reasons why punishment of individuals who have com-
mitted no criminal act is irrational and "absurd," see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S.
514, 543-44 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
106. For an account of traditional eighth amendment analysis and of Robinson's
"novel" break with this tradition, see Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635, 636-50 (1966).
107. See supra note 10.
108. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
109. A kernel of this idea can be found in Justice Marshall's plurality opinion in Pow-
ell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968)(plurality opinion). In discussing the benefits of
being "punished" as opposed to being "treated" with respect to the offender who
commits the offense of public drunkenness, Justice Marshall said:
One virtue of the criminal process is, at least, that the duration of penal
incarceration typically has some outside statutory limit; this is univer-
sally true in the case of petty offenses, such as public drunkenness,
where jail terms are quite short on the whole. 'Therapeutic civil com-
mitment' lacks this feature; one is typically committed until one is
'cured.' Thus, to do otherwise than affirm might subject indigent al-
coholics to the risk that they may be locked up for an indefinite period of
time under the same conditions as before, with no more hope than before
of receiving effective treatment and no prospect of periodic 'freedom.'
Id. at 529.
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eventually may be established by the legislative trend toward punitive
juvenile justice. 1 0 The Supreme Court has identified legislative en-
actments as perhaps the best "indicators of contemporary standards of
decency" in determining eighth amendment rights."' As more and
more jurisdictions embrace systems that punish youthful offenders,
the constitutional claim for a right to such a system becomes stronger
in jurisdictions that cling to the rehabilitative ideal.
D. Judicial Scrutiny of Infringements of the Right to be Punished
Recognition of a constitutional right to be punished does not mean
that all legitimate claims of the right must necessarily be honored.112
Because the right is tied to basic rights of personhood, however, it
should be viewed as a "fundamental" constitutional right for purposes
of judicial review. 113 Thus, governmental infringement of the right,
through involuntary therapeutic or preventive detentions of convicted
offenders, for example, should be subjected to strict scrutiny.114 The
state may deny the right only if it can show that compelling state in-
terests are promoted through the denial and that the denial is neces-
sary for protecting those interests. 1 5
110. See supra text accompanying notes 55-60.
111. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2697 (1988).
112. That the exercise of the right to be punished may sometimes be overridden by
other interests does not deny that the right is an aspect of one's "absolute" right
to be treated as a person. As Professor Morris states:
When I claim... that the right to be treated as a person is absolute what
I claim is that given that one is a person, one always has the right to be so
treated, and while there may possibly be occasions morally requiring not
according a person this right, this fact makes it no less true that the right
exists and would be infringed if the person were not accorded it.
Morris, supra note 1, at 86.
113. "Fundamental constitutional rights" are rights which the United States Supreme
Court recognizes as essential to individual liberty. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 416 (1978)[hereinafter J. NOWAK]. Fundamental
rights analysis recognizes the validity of concepts of "natural rights" theory. Id.
Thus, if the right to be punished is derived from the "natural right" to be treated
as a person, see Morris, supra note 1, at 74, then the right to be punished logically
is a fundamental constitutional right.
114. See J. NOWAK, supra note 113, at 418.
115. This conception of strict scrutiny comports with the Supreme Court's analysis in
equal protection cases in which the state discriminated against members of a
"suspect class." See Developments, The Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1189
(1980). Such scrutiny, however, has not been limited exclusively to equal protec-
tion cases. It also appears in cases reviewing governmental infringements of
other important constitutional rights. For the Court's treatment of free exercise
of religion cases, see L. TRIBE, supra note 78, at 846-59.
Professor Gunther's description of the Court's equal protection scrutiny of
suspect classifications as "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact," Gunther, The
Supreme Court 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972), may also characterize the
result if involuntary therapy were strictly scrutinized, given the dismal success of
past programs of coerced therapy. See, e.g., S. Fox, JUVENILE COURTS 19 (3d ed.
1989]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
E. Implementing the Right to be Punished
Implementation of the right of adolescent persons to be punished
could be achieved without defining the right in terms of a minimum
chronological age. Thus, case-by-case evaluations of the personhood of
any offender under the age set for juvenile court jurisdiction could be
made. The offender, whatever his age, could assert a right to be pun-
ished as an "affirmative defense" when the state seeks to subject him
to coercive therapy or rehabilitation. 116 Once establishing their "per-
sonhood," such offenders would be entitled to appropriate punitive
dispositions except in rare cases where the state shows compelling ne-
cessity to impose therapeutic sanctions.117
Case-by-case assessments of personhood may prove to be adminis-
tratively cumbersome, however.11s A system linking the right to be
punished to chronological age may therefore be desirable. For exam-
ple, "persons" could be defined as youngsters between age fourteen
and the age of majority. Arguably, such a definition provides a reason-
able, non-arbitrary method for dispensing the right to be punished.
The social science literature often refers to fourteen-year-olds as gen-
erally possessing the characteristics of persons.1 19 Moreover, offend-
ers ovdr the age of fourteen were presumed to be criminally
responsible for their conduct at common law.120 Certainly some
youngsters under the age of fourteen could in fact qualify as "per-
sons." The interests of those under age fourteen could be accommo-
dated by employing the common law's rebuttable presumption of non-
1994)(rehabilitation, treatment, etc., an "empty promise" in juvenile courts). The
state would face stiff challenges in justifying such programs under a strict scru-
tinv analysis.
116. The "affirmative defense" to be punished is the opposite of most traditional crim-
inal defenses which defendants employ to avoid conviction and punishment. Nev-
ertheless, certain procedural rules applicable to those defenses seem equally
applicable in the right to be punished context. Thus, as in traditional defense
contexts, the "defendant" may be required to carry both the burdens of produc-
tion and persuasion in right to be punished defenses. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT,
CRIMINAL LAW 51-56 (2d ed. 1986). Perhaps the better policy, however, would be
to require the state to carry the burden of persuasion once the defendant has met
the burden of "producing evidence" of his personhood.
117. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
118. Resolving issues of subjective competency are time consuming and expensive, es-
pecially if both sides employ expert witnesses. However, determining the capac-
ity for rational choice for given young people seemingly entails no greater
administrative difficulty than other kinds of competency determinations rou-
tinely made throughout the law. For a general discussion of a variety of legal
competency issues and procedures, see G. MELTON, J. PETRILA, N. POYTHRESS &
C. SLOBOGIN, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS 65-109 (1987).
119. See supra note 54.
120. See Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra note 32, at 144. Social science data "bears
out the internal coherence of the infancy defense." Walkover, supra note 56, at
543.
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responsibility, 121 thus permitting assertions of the right to be punished
as affirmative defenses on a case-by-case basis.12 2
Chronological age also could operate as a basis for denying applica-
tion of the right to punishment. Similar to the common law's irrebut-
table presumption of incapacity for youths under seven years of age,123
the right to be punished could be denied all children under a stated,
pre-adolescent age so long as a general concensus exists that children
121. See Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra note 32, at 144.
122. Treating youngsters over 14 years of age as "persons" but presuming non-per-
sonhood for those under 14 appears constitutionally permissible. Defining chil-
dren's rights in terms of chronological age is, of course, common.
Perhaps the closest analogy is the traditional employment of chronological age
as a basis for regulating marriage. While marriage has been recognized as a "fun-
damental" constitutional right, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), the courts
have denied the right to marry to young people under a legislatively determined
age. Moreover, the courts have not strictly scrutinized denials of marriage under
chronological age provisions. Thus, in Moe v. Dinkens, 533 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), aff'd per curiam, 669 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1982), cerL denied, 459 U.S. 827
(1982), the court found that New York's use of age as the basis for determining
probable maturity in the absence of parental consent, instead of requiring proof
of maturity on a case-by-case basis, was "reasonable" even if the rule produces
"seemingly arbitrary results in individual cases." Id. at 630. The Moe court spe-
cifically rejected strict scrutiny review of the New York statute which required
parental consent for marriage licenses for all males between ages 16 and 18 and
for all females between 14 and 18. While the rights of some "mature" minors
under the statutory ages may be denied, the court found such denials to be
merely "temporary" and "reasonable" in light of the state's "legitimate" interests
in "mature decision-making with respect to marriage by minors, preventing un-
stable marriages, and protecting the privacy rights of parents to act in the best
interests of their children." Id. at 630-31. A fourth state interest, discouraging
marriage in order to encourage minors to stay in school, see, e.g., Davis v. Meek,
344 F. Supp. 298, 300 (N.D. Ohio 1972), also could be added to support the age
restriction in Moe.
Because the system described in the text does not absolutely foreclose exer-
cise of the constitutional rights at issue, the system appears constitutionally per-
missible afortiori under Moe, given the reasonableness of drawing lines at age 14.
See supra text accompanying notes 119-20. While Moe permits drawing the line
at age 18 for purposes of the right to marry, nothing in the case justifies a conclu-
sion that 18 years of age is a permissible place to trigger the exercise of any and
all constitutional rights. The state interests in protecting parental privacy and
discouraging youthful marriages may support setting the age for marriage at 18.
Such interests are obviously not pertinent to deciding the age for exercise of the
right to be punished. No alternative state interests appear sufficient to outweigh
the rights of 14-year-old persons to be punished.
Finally, the system described in the text is offered merely as an example of an
age-based model which would pass constitutional muster. Punitive juvenile jus-
tice systems which draw lines at ages other than 14 also may be consitutional.
Constitutional problems appear to increase, however, as the line is drawn higher
and higher above age 14, thus denying the right to be punished to more and more
adolescent persons.
123. See Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra note 32, at 144.
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under that age lack the capacity to be culpable.124
V. JUVENILE JUSTICE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO
BE PUNISHED
The legal implications of the right to be punished as it relates to
the traditional model of juvenile justice appear enormous. This sec-
tion considers a few of the substantive and procedural effects of the
right.
A. Substantive Effects
The most famous juvenile case, In re Gault,125 provides a useful
vehicle for exploring the substantive ramifications of the right to be
punished. The doctrinal power of the rights to personhood and pun-
ishment is illustrated by a rethinking of Gerald Gault's case.
Fifteen-year-old Gerald, while still on six months' probation for
having been in the company of another boy who stole a wallet from a
woman's purse, was accused of making an obscene phone call, an of-
fense punishable in the criminal system by a maximum fine of five to
fifty dollars, or a jail sentence of up to two months. Because Gerald
was a juvenile, his case was not brought in criminal court, but instead
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. In proceedings making
kangaroo courts appear models of due process by comparison, the ju-
venile court judge adjudicated Gerald a delinquent126 and ordered him
124. A system having an age provision embodying such a general concensus likely
would be subjected to minimal scrutiny by courts entertaining claims of denial of
the right to be punished by children below the chosen age. For a discussion of the
analogous situation in the marital age context, see supra note 122.
125. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
126. Id. at 29. After a complaint by a neighbor that Gerald Gault had made an obscene
phone call, Gault was taken into custody by the police. The arresting officer initi-
ated the adjudication proceeding by filing a petition in juvenile court alleging
only that Gerald Gault was "under the age of eighteen years, and is in need of the
protection of this Honorable Court; [and that] said minor is a delinquent minor."
Id. at 5. The petition alleged no factual basis for the judicial action proposed and
was never served on Gerald or his parents. After spending the night in the deten-
tion center, Gerald, along with his parents, appeared without counsel at a hearing
that was held on the petition. The complaining neighbor did not attend, no wit-
nesses were sworn, and no record of the proceedings was prepared. The juvenile
judge questioned Gerald about the neighbor's complaint as related to the judge by
the arresting officer to whom Gault allegedly had admitted making the obscene
call. The judge decided to "think about" the matter. Gerald was taken back to
the detention center where he spent three or folr more days and then was re-
leased to the custody of his parents.
Several days later a second "hearing" was held, again without counsel or the
complaining witness. Probation officers filed a "referral report" with the court,
but did not disclose its contents to Gerald or his parents. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the judge committed Gerald as a juvenile delinquent to the State Indus-
trial School. Id. at 6-7.
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indefinitely committed to the State Industrial School for the remain-
der of his minority, "that is, until 21, unless sooner discharged."'127
Thus, Gerald was confined in the name of rehabilitation possibly for
an excess of five years because he committed an act punishable by no
more than two months in jail.
The case reached the United States Supreme Court which held
that Gerald's procedural due process rights had been violated.128 The
Court observed:
Ultimately, however, we confront the reality of that portion of the Juvenile
Court process with which we deal in this case. A boy is charged with miscon-
duct. The boy is committed to an institution where he may be restrained of
liberty for years. It is of no constitutional consequence-and of limited practi-
cal meaning-that the institution to which he is committed is called an Indus-
trial School. The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a
'receiving home' or an 'industrial school' for juveniles is an institution of con-
finement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. His
world becomes 'a building with whitewashed walls, regimented routine and
institutional hours.... .' Instead of mother and father and sisters and brothers
and friends and classmates, his world is peopled by guards, custodians, state
employees, and 'delinquents' confined with him for anything from wayward-
ness to rape and homicide.
1 2 9
Interestingly, however, Gault dealt only with procedural matters
and never addressed the substantive issue of whether committing Ger-
ald for an excess of five years in the State Industrial School would be
permissible if he were afforded full procedural protections at his adju-
dication hearing. Had Gerald been given proper notice, assistance of
counsel, etc., he still would have risked the possibility of "doing five-
plus years" for a measly two-month offense. Such a situation raises
questions of additional violations of Gerald's rights distinct from those
assessed by the Gault Court.
Traditional juvenile justice wisdom sees no necessary violation of
young people's rights in confining them for longer periods as "delin-
127. Id. at 7.
128. The Court held Gerald and others in similar situations who risk incarceration in
state detention facilities if found to be delinquent are constitutionally entitled to
the following rights in their adjudication proceedings: notice of the charges;
assistance of counsel; rights of confrontation and cross-examination; and the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 31-57.
The Gault Court rejected the view that the juvenile justice system is an en-
tirely benign dispenser of parens patriae therapy and rehabilitation to youths
who deviate from socially accepted norms of conduct. The Court noted that the
system's tradition of procedural informality was intended to achieve the enlight-
ened goal of protecting youthful offenders from the harshness of criminal pro-
ceedings. In reality, however, the system failed to attain its rehabilitative goals
and often was nothing more than a mechanism that stigmatized youths as delin-
quents and restricted their liberty. Thus, the Gault Court found the essentials of
due process and fair treatment under the fourteenth amendment entitled
juveniles to increased procedural protections. Id. at 22-28.
129. Id. at 27.
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quents" than they could be confined as "criminals."130 Chief Justice
Rehnquist recently summarized the established protectionist view:
[J]uveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody. Children by
definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves.
They are assumed to be subject to the control of parents, and if parental con-
trol falters, the State must play its part as parens patriae.1 3 1
Protectionist rights theory as reflected in the rehabilitative ideal
permits the state to confine Gerald Gault for years for doing some-
thing for which an adult may incur only a small fine. In the protec-
tionist's eyes, he is always "in custody," whether at home or in the
State Industrial School. Of course, Gerald could argue that his con-
finement was inconsistent with the therapeutic premises of juvenile
justice.132 However, as long as he receives "therapy," "treatment," or
"rehabilitation," his rights have not been infringed. Indeed, he re-
ceives everything to which he is entitled under protectionist theory.
Dispositions like the one imposed on Gerald are problematic in
part bedause they do not rehabilitate-if anything, they make a trou-
bled youngster more troubled.S But suppose reliable evidence ex-
isted to justify the belief that Gerald's indeterminate commitment to
the State Industrial School really would improve his life. Assuming
he possesses normal competency for people of his age, his incarcera-
tion nevertheless would seriously threaten his basic human rights.
If Gerald's rights are violated by a potential five-year stint in the
Industrial School--even assuming that such is indeed a meaningfully
130. "[A] number of state courts have concluded that committing juveniles to institu-
tions for longer periods than would be permissible in the case of adults charged
with the same offense violates neither due process nor equal protection of the
law." S. DAVIS, supra note 42, at 6-19.
131. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1983).
132. A few such actions have been successful. See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352
(7th Cir. 1974).
133. In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966), the Supreme Court noted
"[t]here is evidence ... that there may be grounds for concern that the [delin-
quent] child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protec-
tions accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
postulated for children." A year later, the Gault Court cited statistics from the
President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia which found recidi-
vism rates over 50% for juvenile offenders who had had prior contact with the
juvenile court. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1967). In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528, 544-45 n.5 (1971), the Court quoted the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 9 (1967) which concluded: "In theory [the juve-
nile court] was to exercise its protective powers to bring an errant child back into
the fold. In fact, there is increasing reason to believe that its intervention rein-
forces the juvenile's unlawful impulses."
A leading commentator has concluded that "the evidence continues to mount
that reliance on the juvenile process as rehabilitative rather than punitive in na-
ture has paid more heed to rhetoric than to reality." S. DAVIS, supra note 42, at 6-
19.
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rehabilitative sanction-protectionism obviously fails to provide an ad-
equate theoretical ground for his rights. Coercive therapy for "adult
persons" making obscene phone calls would violate their rights to be
punished.134 Surely Gerald Gault might have wished to assert the
same claim. Assuming that he possessed the attributes of adolescent
personhood (capacity for rational choice), he would have been entitled
to be punished for what he did rather than be treated for who he is.
Moreover, his punishment should, if anything, be less severe than that
imposed upon similarly situated adults. 3 5
While the right of juveniles to be punished doubtless appears con-
troversial, several jurisdictions already afford versions of the right to
youthful offenders who seek punishment in lieu of therapeutic dispo-
sition. Under Florida statutory law,136 for example, cases of young-
sters fourteen years of age or older at the time the alleged violation
occurred may be waived to criminal court for trial. The child thereaf-
ter shall be subject to prosecution, trial, and sentencing as if the child
were an adult. The statute expressly provides:
[Tihe court shall transfer and certify the case for trial as if the child were an
adult if the child is alleged to have committed a violation of law, and, the child,
joined by a parent or, in the absence of a parent, by his guardian or guardian
ad litem, demands in writing to be tried as an adult.1 3 7
The statute recognizes waiver on demand, mandatory and not discre-
tionary with juvenile court judge,138 as an aspect of a state constitu-
tional right of children to be tried as adults "upon demand made as
provided by law before a trial in a juvenile proceeding."139
The State of Florida thus provides adolescents and their parents a
right to the same system of punishment available to adults. But, as
the above discussion suggests, the Florida scheme does not fully re-
flect the right of youthful offenders to be punished. Autonomous per-
sons should be able to exercise their rights free from parental power
to veto those rights.40 Moreover, adolescent persons are entitled to a
134. See supra notes 1-23 and accompanying text. The conclusion in the text assumes
that the offense of making obscene phone calls constitutes a "primary rule"
within the criminal system. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. A variety
of similar offenses such as obscene libel, indecent exposure, and obscene language
were indictable offenses at common law. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL
LAW 471-74 (3d ed. 1982).
135. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
136. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02(5)(a) (West Supp. 1988).
137. Id. § 39.02(5)(b) (emphasis added).
138. Sumner v. Williams, 304 So. 2d 472 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
139. FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 15(b). The Florida courts have suggested that part of the
rationale for the right to proceed in criminal court is to afford the opportunity for
jury trials, unavailable in juvenile proceedings. Summer v. Williams, 304 So. 2d
472,473 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). The right may also be understood as embracing
the right to be punished as discussed in this Article.
140. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)(competent pregnant
minors possess right to make abortion decision free of parental consent). The
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system of punishment, but generally to one embodying less punish-
ment than that established for their adult counterparts committing
the same offense.141
Full-blown recognition of adolescents as persons possessing the
right to be punished would require systematic reform of the juvenile
justice system with determinate punitive sanctions replacing the tradi-
tional indeterminate rehabilitative dispositions.142 Moreover, the
sanctions for juvenile offenders must be scaled down, in perhaps both
form and degree, from those imposed for the same offense within the
criminal system. "Waivers" of juvenile court jurisdiction to the crimi-
nal courts in appropriate cases may be retained so long as criminal
dispositions are consistent with principles of justice and the demands
of social protection.143
Finally, because the right to be punished entails the right to be
fairly punished,'" adolescent persons subjected to a system of puni-
tive juvenile justice must be afforded the full panoply of traditional
defenses available in the criminal system.145
B. Procedural Effects
In addition to substantive effects, several procedural consequences
flow from recognition of the right to be punished. In most states,
juveniles have no right to procedural due process protections when
jurisdiction over their cases is waived from criminal court to juvenile
Illinois version of the right to be punished permits minors 13 years of age or over
to elect criminal prosecutions with "consent of counsel." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37,
§ 804-4(5)(Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1988). See People v. Thomas, 34 Ill. App. 3d
1002, 341 N.E.2d 178 (1976)(no judicial discretion to reject demand for criminal
proceedings under § 804-4(5)). See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (Supp. V 1987) for a federal
version of criminal proceedings on demand.
141. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
142. Apart from the requirement of a general theory of less severe punishments for
juveniles than adult criminals, this Article offers no specific system of sanctions.
Several existing models are worthy of consideration. See, e.g., STANDARDS, supra
note 56; Walkover, supra note 56, at 528-31 (discussing the Washington model).
The Article's proposal for scaled-down punishments, of course, assumes disposi-
tions respecting the dignity and personhood of juvenile offenders.
143. See supra note 39. See also Feld, supra note 54.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
145. The only defense which might not be applicable in a system of punitive juvenile
justice is the defense of infancy, and then only in systems reasonably employing
chronological age as a proxy for personhood. See supra text accompanying notes
118-24. Such systems might incorporate the infancy defense in defining substan-
tive rights, and thus render the traditional affirmative defense redundant. On
the other hand, the infancy defense would be critically important should the gov-
ernment seek to impose punishment on youngsters not yet "persons." See Puni-
tive Juvenile Justice, supra note 32, at 143-46.
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court;146 procedural protections are required only where waiver is
from juvenile to criminal court.147 This rule appears to be based on a
perception that the juvenile loses no significant interest when his case
is transferred from a punitive system to a therapeutic one. Suppos-
edly, the transfer will benefit the juvenile who is about to partake of
parens patriae blessings. However, as illustrated by the discussion of
In re Gault,148 juveniles whose cases are transferred from the crimi-
nal courts may in fact lose a great deal-the right to be punished. Like
other fundamental rights, this interest should not be denied without
procedural protections, including the right to a judicial hearing with
the assistance of counsel and the requirement that the state show the
necessity of denying the person's right to be punished. 49 As the
Supreme Court has said in another context, "there is no place in our
system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences
without ceremony."150
Implementation of the right to be punished within the juvenile sys-
tem also would often carry a right to trial by jury. Supreme Court
case law recognizes the right to trial by jury for offenses punishable by
incarceration in excess of six months.151 Even though nearly all the
procedural protections of the criminal process are also constitutionally
required in the juvenile justice system,152 the Court found the sixth
amendment right to trial by jury is not mandated in current delin-
quency adjudications, in part, because juvenile justice is presumed to
be nonpunitive and rehabilitative in nature. 53 The right of juveniles
to be punished, therefore, would carry with it the same jury trial
rights as are enjoyed by adult offenders.154
146. S. Fox, supra note 115, at 66; Vega v. Bell, 74 N.Y.2d 543, 393 N.E.2d 450, 419
N.Y.S.2d 454 (1979).
147. S. Fox, supra note 115, at 66.
148. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See supra text accompanying notes 125-35.
149. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966)(enumerating procedural rights tojudicial hearing, counsel, access to social report, and statement of reasons in pro-
ceedings to waive juvenile court jurisdiction to the adult criminal process). For
discussion of the requirement of an infringement of substantive interests as a
prerequisite to procedural due process rights, see supru note 47.
150. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
151. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
152. In addition to the protections afforded by In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court
has imposed further procedural protections in the juvenile justice system. See
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975)(double jeopardy clause prohibits trial as adults
if juveniles have been subjected previously to a delinquency hearing on the same
charge); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)("reasonable doubt" standard required
in delinquency adjudications).
153. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). See Feld, supra note 44, at 247;
Punishment and Juvenile Justice, supra note 7, at 829-33.
154. See In re Felder, 93 Misc. 2d 369, 402 N.Y.S.2d 528 (Fain. Ct., Onondaga County
1978). In Felder, a sixth amendment right to jury trials exists under New York's




This Article has outlined a theory of the right to be punished, dis-
cussed its possible status as a legally enforceable interest available to a
class of juvenile offenders, and noted several of the more significant
implications of the right. Although recognition of the right to be pun-
ished would transform the face of juvenile justice, the transformation
already may have begun. Several jurisdictions have become suffi-
ciently disenchanted with the rehabilitative ideal to have recently em-
braced explicitly punitive sanctions as appropriate for juvenile
offenders.155 Some jurisdictions already permit jury trials in juvenile
cases 156 and many commentators argue that the openness and public
scrutiny of the legal system entailed therein is long overdue in the
juvenile system.1 57
These reform movements toward punitive juvenile justice require
rethinking the nature of the rights of youthful offenders. The time
for such rethinking may well be at hand for all interested observers of
juvenile justice. Treating competent kids as persons with rights to
fair, proportionate, humane punishment could well be an important
step forward in the quest for a legal order respectful of individual
rights. Some might worry that recognition of the right to be punished
would, in the words of one commentator, constitute "abandoning chil-
dren to their... rights."158 But being "abandoned" with the rights
discussed in this Article when the state intervenes in the lives of ado-
lescent law breakers may well be preferable to being "rescued" by pa-
ternalistic governmental meddling. Mindful of Gerald Gault's
predicament, C.S. Lewis's observations ring as true for juvenile per-
sons as they do for adult offenders:
finement, either for six- or twelve-month intervals, for juveniles committing cer-
tain enumerated offenses and were found to be in need of restrictive placement.
While the state argued that the sanction was rehabilitative and thus removed the
case from sixth amendment scope, the court concluded that "[when... what is
actually a punishment is characterized as treatment, an abuse of constitutional
dimension has occurred, and, a jury trial is required before punishment although
appropriate, may be inflicted." Id. at 375, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
155. See supra note 56.
156. W. WADLINGTON, supra note 30, at 485.
157. See, e.g., Foley, Juveniles and Their Right to a Jury Trial, 15 VILL. L. REV. 972
(1970); Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of
Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 7, 19-21; Parker, Instant Maturation for
the Post Gault "Hood", 4 FAM. L.Q. 113 (1970); Note, Minnesota Juvenile Court
Rules: Brightening One World for Juveniles, 54 MINN. L. REV. 303, 324-25 (1969);
Note, Criminal Offenders in the Juvenile Court More Brickbats and Another
Proposal, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1171, 1185-86 (1966).
158. Children's Liberation, supra note 32, at 643. In this work, Dean Hafen argues for
protectionist rights in contexts generally outside the juvenile justice system,
often with the value of protecting family privacy firmly in mind. Therefore, he
may be less concerned with granting personhood rights to children in the context
of this Article where family privacy issues are less relevant.
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Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may
be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons than
under omnipotent moral busybodies. The robber baron's cruelty may some-
times sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who torment
us for our own good will torment without end for they do so with the approval
of their own conscience. They may be more likely to go to Heaven yet at the
same time likelier to make a Hell of earth. Their very kindness stings with
intolerable insult. To be 'cured' against one's will and cured of states which
we may not regard as disease is to be put on a level with those who have not
yet reached the age of reason or those who never will; to be classed with in-
fants, imbeciles, and domestic animals. But to be punished, however severely,
because we have deserved it, because we 'ought to have known better,' is to be
treated as a human person made in God's image.1 5 9
159. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 REs JUDICATA 224,228 (1953,
reprinted 1982).
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